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I. INTRODUCTION
In an article recently published in the Harvard Law Review,' we made
essentially four points: (1) defensive open market repurchases should be
outlawed because they exert precisely the pressures on target shareholders
that Congress sought to eliminate by adopting the Williams Act in 1968;
(2) defensive open market repurchases should be outlawed because target
managers can use them to defeat value-increasing takeover bids; (3) defen-
sive self-tender offers, subject to certain conditions, should continue to be
legal because target managers can use them to defeat value-decreasing but
not value-increasing takeover bids; and (4) defensive self-tender offers,
subject to certain conditions, should continue to be legal because they tend
to "even the playing field" in corporate control contests by enabling target
managers to compete fairly with interfirm bidders for the right to manage
the target's resources.
In a comment appearing in this Journal,2 Professors Gordon and
Kornhauser challenge these four conclusions. Specifically, they argue that
"target stock buybacks are unlikely to increase shareholder wealth as a
general matter and, on a shareholder wealth criterion, should not be per-
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mitted as a defensive tactic."' Thus, although Gordon and Kornhauser
ultimately agree with us that defensive open market repurchases should be
barred, they would go further, and outlaw defensive self-tenders as well."
The Gordon and Kornhauser critique is unpersuasive. First, in re-
examining defensive open market repurchase programs, they confuse the
firm's investment/production decisions with its financing decisions, and as
a result provide no new insights into either the uses or the abuses of such
repurchase programs. Second, in analyzing defensive self-tender offers,
they overstate the likely costs of our proposal and slight the benefits that
defensive self-tenders can provide. More specifically, they exaggerate
problematic aspects of the conditions that we suggested for such transac-
tions, and mistakenly conclude that the valuable function we ascribed to
defensive self-tenders is adequately served by other mechanisms.
Of the conditions that we would impose on defensive self-tender offers,
the most objectionable to Gordon and Kornhauser is our proposal to nul-
lify the target shareholders' appraisal remedy in the context of such trans-
actions.6 They attack this suggestion as radical and conceptually unjustifi-
able,' and criticize us for revealing this feature of our scheme only "in the
form of a footnote."'7 We agree with their implicit point that this aspect of
our proposal deserves fuller discussion than we were able to provide in
our article, and therefore welcome this opportunity to explore the issue
further. Indeed, most of our comments here will concern the role of the
appraisal remedy and its proper application in corporate control contests.
Our conclusion, however, remains unchanged: The appraisal remedy
should be unavailable to target shareholders once target management has
effected a defensive self-tender.
This reply is organized as follows. In Part II, we respond to Gordon
and Kornhauser's examination of defensive open market repurchases by
showing that their criticism of our discussion stems from a flawed analysis
that confuses the firm's investment/production decisions with its financing
decisions. In Part III, we review our analysis of defensive self-tender of-
fers and our claim that such transactions should be permitted, subject to
certain conditions. We illustrate the importance of defensive self-tenders to
the efficiency of the market for corporate control and describe how their
availability can help prevent value-decreasing interfirm bids. We then dis-
cuss Gordon and Kornhauser's proposal to outlaw defensive self-tender
offers. We argue that such a ban would unfairly advantage interfirm bid-
3. Id. at 297.
4. Id. at 311.
5. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1419 n.150.
6. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 309.
7. Id. at 311.
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ders and, as a result, could allow corporate raiders to expropriate the
wealth of target shareholders. We also respond specifically to Gordon and
Kornhauser's criticism of our proposal to nullify the appraisal remedy
once target managers make a defensive self-tender; we show that the con-
straints impgsed by appraisal statutes on interfirm bidders can empower
target managers to defeat value-increasing takeover bids, and argue fur-
ther that target shareholders do not need the appraisal remedy in the con-
text of a defensive self-tender.
Finally, in Part IV, we briefly present three alternative reforms of the
appraisal remedy that would accomplish our overall objective of "evening"
the competition between target managers and interfirm bidders in control
contests.
II. DEFENSIVE OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES
A. Review of the Bradley and Rosenzweig Analysis
In our article, we argued that defensive open market repurchase pro-
grams should be outlawed. More specifically, we suggested that defensive
stock repurchases should be permitted only if effected as self-tender offers
and subjected to the same requirements that are imposed on interfirm
bids.
Our proposal is based on two related propositions. First, as currently
regulated, defensive open market repurchases create precisely the pres-
sures on shareholders that led Congress to regulate tender offers; as first-
come, first-served premium offers, defensive open market repurchases are
"tender offers," as Congress understood that term.' Second, because of the
coerciveness of defensive open market repurchases under current regula-
tions, such repurchases can help target managers defeat value-increasing
interfirm bids." This gives target managers an advantage in control con-
tests and can impede the flow of corporate resources to their highest val-
ued uses. Our proposal to regulate all defensive stock repurchases as self-
tender offers (subject to certain conditions discussed below) would elimi-
nate this advantage and "even the playing field" on which interfirm bid-
ders and target managers compete. This result would comport with Con-
gress' goal of regulatory neutrality'0 and would also facilitate a more
efficient allocation of target assets.'
Central to both propositions is the coerciveness that we ascribe to defen-
sive open market repurchases. We devoted much of our article to a formal
8. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1393-98, 1401-04.
9. Id. at 1396-99.
10. See id. at 1406-07.
11. See id. at 1408-11.
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demonstration of that coerciveness; here we will try to illustrate it more
briefly and intuitively.
Consider, in the context of a value-increasing interfirm tender offer, the
time-series behavior of the market price of target shares. We assume that
the pre-offer market price of the target shares reflects the value of the
target's resources in their current allocation, i.e., under the direction of the
current target managers. By definition, the announcement of a value-
increasing tender offer will raise the market price of target shares above
its pre-offer level. The post-announcement but pre-execution market price
of the target shares will reflect the terms of the bid and the probability
that the offer will be accepted. Assuming that all target shareholders will
tender their shares, the post-announcement but pre-execution market
price of the target shares will be:
(1) P = [F x Pt] + [(1 - F) x Pe] > Po
where
P = the post-announcement, pre-execution market price of the target
shares;
Pt = the per share offer price;
Pe = the expected post-execution market price of the target shares not
purchased;
Po - the pre-offer market price of the target shares; and
F - the fraction of the target shares sought by the bidding firm."2
Suppose that after the announcement of the interfirm bid, when the
market price has increased to reflect the premium of that bid, target man-
agers embark on an open market repurchase program. Specifically, as-
sume that the target managers announce that they will buy a significant
fraction of the target shares in the open market at the prevailing market
(supply) price. Under these conditions, the supply price of the target
shares will be the expected value of the outstanding offer, or P in Equa-
tion (1).
Consider now the response of a fully informed target shareholder to the
outstanding interfirm bid and the defensive open market repurchase pro-
gram. The choice facing the target shareholder is either to tender to the
interfirm bidder and realize an expected value of P per share, or to sell
the shares in the open market, which is equivalent to selling them back to
the target firm, again at a price equal to P. Target shareholders (or mar-
ket arbitrageurs)13 would realize that if the target managers repurchase a
significant fraction of the target shares at a premium relative to the pre-
12. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 353
(1980). For a discussion of the assumptions on which this model depends, see Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 1, at 1391-93.
13. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1393 n.60.
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offer price, the remaining unpurchased shares will sell at a discount rela-
tive to the same benchmark.14 In addition, they would understand that the
repurchase will be effected on a first-come, first-served basis; only those
target shareholders who move quickly enough to participate in the repur-
chase program will receive the expected value of the takeover (P in Equa-
tion (1)). Those who are unable to sell their shares back to the target will
suffer a capital loss. Thus, nonparticipating shareholders will in effect fi-
nance the premium that is paid to the selling shareholders in the open
market buyback.
In sum, a defensive open market repurchase program is equivalent to a
first-come, first-served, premium tender offer. As a result, target share-
holders will be pressured to sell their shares to the target managers rather
than tender to the interfirm bidder, even though the interfirm tender is at
a substantial premium.
The implications of the above analysis are clear. Defensive open market
repurchase programs should be prohibited because they exert precisely the
pressures on target shareholders that Congress intended to eliminate by
adopting the Williams Act.1 5 Moreover, target managers can use such
transactions to defeat value-increasing bids, which gives those managers
an advantage over interfirm bidders that undermines the Congressional
goal of regulatory neutrality'" and impedes an efficient allocation of cor-
porate resources."
B. The Gordon and Kornhauser Criticism
Although Gordon and Kornhauser agree with our proposal to bar de-
fensive open market repurchase programs, they nevertheless feel com-
pelled to show that, contrary to our analysis, such transactions need not
"distort shareholder choice."'" In other words, they purport to demon-
strate that a defensive open market repurchase program need not effect a
wealth transfer from non-selling to selling shareholders.
To make their point, Gordon and Kornhauser focus on the way that
target managers finance a defensive stock repurchase. They assert, in our
view implausibly, that most (all?) share repurchases are financed through
the sale of target assets, and then argue that the profitability of such asset
14. Algebraically, if F of the target shares are repurchased at a premium R, then subsequent to
the repurchase the remaining (1 - F) of the firm's shares will trade at a discount of (F x R)/(1 - F).
As we noted in our article, this analysis assumes, consistent with existing empirical evidence, that
the target's value under current management will not be affected by announcement of either the
interfirm bid or the repurchase offer. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1395 n.63.
15. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1401-04.
16. Id. at 1406-07.
17. Id. at 1408-11.
18. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 304.
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sales can increase the value of the firm. 9 More particularly, they claim
that the profits from an asset sale can sometimes increase the value of the
firm to a level equivalent to the value of the premium interfirm bid. If the
asset sale generates profits sufficient to increase the value of target shares
to P in Equation (1), they say, then purchasing shares in the open market
at that price will not impose a capital loss on the non-selling shareholders.
As a result, they conclude, target management's open market repurchases
will not be coercive.20
Under the conditions they specify, of course, Gordon and Kornhauser
are correct. But the problem with their analysis should be obvious even to
those only casually acquainted with principles of financial economics.
Gordon and Kornhauser confuse the firm's financing decisions with its
investment/production decisions. Naturally, if the firm can increase its
value by selling off assets, then the repurchase may be non-coercive. In-
deed, in our article we explicitly qualified our analysis by assuming un-
changed investment/production decisions and therefore a constant firm
value. 1 As we noted, a target's management is always free to change its
investment/production decisions in an effort to increase the target's value
and thereby defeat an unwanted takeover bid, although empirical evidence
suggests that this does not often happen.2
Gordon and Kornhauser cannot understand why target managers might
find defensive open market repurchases useful for hindering interfirm bids
because they imagine that such managers have up their sleeves an inex-
haustible supply of value-increasing investment/production strategies (in-
cluding the ability to generate the synergistic gains contemplated by the
bidder). But if this were true, we would expect targets that successfully
preserve their independence to fare much better than they apparently
do.2 In this case, therefore, the familiar analytical mode of financial eco-
nomics-holding investment/production decisions constant-is especially
compelling."'
19. Id. at 303-05.
20. Id.
21. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1395 n.63, 1420 n.152, 1421 n.154, 1426 n.169.
See also supra note 14 (repeating assumption). Thus, contrary to Gordon and Kornhauser's assertion,
our analysis does not assume a mismanaged asset sale or, for that matter, any asset sale at all. See
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 303.
22. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1389 n.51 (describing empirical studies demon-
strating that value of target that preserves its independence generally does not exceed pre-bid value).
23. Id. Interestingly, Gordon and Kornhauser offer no explanation for the one case for which
reliable data are available-the Carter Hawley Hall defensive open market repurchase program. In
that case, shareholder response and the price behavior of the target's shares matched the predictions of
our analysis and compellingly demonstrated the effectiveness of defensive open market repurchases.
See id. at 1398 n.69.
24. In addition, if their purpose is to examine all possible results of an asset sale, Gordon and
Kornhauser's analysis seems incomplete. Thus, an asset sale could in fact generate profits in excess of
the premium offered by the bidding firm. Gordon and Kornhauser acknowledge this possibility, but
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III. DEFENSIVE SELF-TENDER OFFERS
A. Review of the Bradley and Rosenzweig Analysis
We argue that defensive self-tender offers should be permitted, subject
to certain restrictions. Allowing defensive self-tenders tends to "even the
playing field" in control contests by permitting target managers to com-
pete on an equal footing with the managers of bidding firms. A fair com-
petition between the managers of targets and bidders for the right to con-
trol the target's resources will lead to the optimal allocation of those
resources.2 5 This result, moreover, is consistent with the policy of even-
handedness that Congress favored in regulating tender offers.2 6 We there-
fore conclude that interfifn bids and defensive self-tenders should be reg-
ulated alike. Thus, taking the basic regulatory scheme of the Williams Act
as given, we argue that the same restrictions should apply to both types of
tender offers.27
If not subjected to certain additional restrictions, however, target man-
agers would still enjoy a significant competitive edge against interfirm bid-
ders. Specifically, we showed in our article that defensive self-tenders
could defeat even value-increasing interfirm bids if target managers were
permitted either (1) to seek fewer shares than the number sought by the
interfirm bidder, 8 or (2) to exclude the bidder from participating in the
self-tender.2 ' Accordingly, we proposed to bar defensive self-tenders that
either exclude the bidder 30 or seek fewer shares than the bidder has
sought.
As long as defensive self-tenders were thus regulated, they would re-
conclude without explanation that "[i]t seems improbable . . . that very many target managements
will be successful in this way." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 306 n.30. Absent further
explanation, it is not clear under the Gordon and Kornhauser analysis why defensive stock repur-
chases can "never increase shareholder wealth." Id. at 306.
Gordon and Kornhauser claim further that their "analysis also applies where the repurchase is
financed through the target's cash on hand, or, in a more complex form, where it is financed through
debt." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 303 n.22. This claim is simply incorrect. Assuming
unchanged investment/production decisions, financing the repurchase with cash on hand or additional
debt will have no effect on the total value of the target resources. Indeed, our analysis of defensive
open market repurchases assumes that such repurchases would be financed with cash on hand or new
debt and, as we show, such repurchases are in fact coercive. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1393-98.
25. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1408-12.
26. Id. at 1406-08.
27. See id. at 1407 & n.102 (noting recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule
amendments designed to eliminate distinctions in the regulation of interfirm bids and self-tenders).
28. Id. at 1421-23. See also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., Civ. No. 8584,
n.11 (Del. Ch., Sept. 18, 1986) (preliminarily enjoining defensive self-tender that sought fewer shares
than number sought by interfirm bidder).
29. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1423-27.
30. The SEC recently amended Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986), to'bar such discrimi-
nation. See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421 [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,016 (July 11, 1986).
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present an important safeguard against corporate raids-that is, bidder
attempts to expropriate target shareholder wealth-but not a mechanism
by which managers could block desirable asset redeployments and deprive
their shareholders of substantial premiums. In other words, target manag-
ers could use self-tenders to solve the prisoner's dilemma that might other-
wise pressure target shareholders into accepting a value-decreasing bid,31
but they could not use them to defeat value-increasing acquisitions.3 2 The
result would be the more even playing field that we favor.
In our article, we noted a serious objection to our proposal. Because the
appraisal remedy and fair-price charter provisions preclude interfirm bid-
ders (but of course not target managers) from undertaking a second-step
takeout merger at less than the pre-offer market price of target shares, it
follows that even under the above conditions, self-tendering target manag-
ers might enjoy a competitive advantage that would permit them to defeat
value-increasing interfirm bids." We also responded briefly to this objec-
tion.34 First, we noted that the appraisal remedy and fair-price charter
provisions in fact constrain interfirm bidders only to the extent that a
takeout merger is likely. We observed that bidder attempts to expropriate
target wealth through self-dealing may be less detectable than some be-
lieve, which makes back end takeouts far less than inevitable. Second, we
suggested that it may make sense simply to nullify the appraisal remedy
and fair-price provisions once target managers have effected a defensive
self-tender offer.
3 5
B. The Gordon and Kornhauser Criticism6
Gordon and Kornhauser attack both of our responses to the appraisal
remedy "problem" originally identified by us. First, they say that second-
31. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1412-17.
32. See id. at 1417-28.
33. Id. at 1419 n.150.
34. Id.
35. In our article, we did not consider the distinction between legislatively-adopted fair-price pro-
visions and those that are effected by charter amendment, with shareholder approval. Upon further
reflection, shareholder-approved provisions concern us less than those mandated by legislatures, al-
though not because our analysis pertains less to the former than the latter. Rather, we are reluctant to
advance a policy prescription that might constrain the "contract" into which shareholders may volun-
tarily enter. While some might challenge this reluctance by suggesting that infirmities in shareholder
voting may justify constraints that are designed to ensure "fairness" for shareholders, analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this reply. See generally R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 306-39 (1986) (discussing collective action and free rider problems).
Thus, since our thesis (like the Gordon and Kornhauser critique) deals primarily with the statutory
appraisal remedy, we will omit further discussion of fair-price charter amendments.
36. In view of our disagreement with Gordon and Kornhauser regarding the relevance of financ-
ing decisions to an analysis of defensive stock repurchases, see supra Part II.B., we do not respond to
their claim that the target's sale of "special synergy assets" to finance a defensive self-tender may
result in decreased shareholder wealth. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 307. Instead, we
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step takeout mergers are virtually inevitable, particularly in view of fair-
price charter provisions designed to force takeouts in the event of self-
dealing.17 Second, and more significantly, they claim that nullifying the
appraisal remedy in the event of a defensive self-tender would clash with
the very justification for that protection. 8
We disagree on both counts. With regard to the likelihood of a second-
step takeout merger, Gordon and Kornhauser simply repeat Professor
Carney's assertion that such a takeout is highly probable. Like Professor
Carney, however, they offer no evidence for their belief that wealth expro-
priation through self-dealing cannot go undetected.3 9 It is questionable
whether even the most carefully drafted charter provision could define
self-dealing sufficiently precisely or artfully to make takeouts as common
a consequence of wealth expropriation as Gordon and Kornhauser claim.
Indeed, as Professor Bebchuk notes, "those instances in which the ac-
quirer decides against an immediate takeout are exactly the instances in
which the acquirer expects that, by diverting earnings or effecting a dis-
tant takeout, it will leave minority shareholders with even less than it
would have to pay them in an immediate takeout."4 Thus, we continue to
believe that acquiring firms have considerable freedoin to self deal with
controlled but only partially owned subsidiaries."1
confine our discussion to their "more general and direct objection[s] to self-tenders." Id.
One such objection is the Gordon and Kornhauser claim that "[a] management competition argu-
ment is a poor justification" for defensive self-tenders. Id. Specifically, Gordon and Kornhauser argue
that our reliance on the competition argument is inappropriate because (1) the bidder's willingness to
make a premium offer suggests that target management has already lost the competition, and (2) self-
tendering target managers ari using shareholders' money rather than their own to fight off the in-
terfirm bidder. Id. Neither point is persuasive.
First, we noted repeatedly in our article that defensive self-tenders should be available to protect
target shareholders against value-decreasing bids. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at
1412-28. Gordon and Kornhauser's focus on premium bids entirely misses this point, and also ignores
our assertion that defensive self-tenders (subject to our conditions) could defeat premium bids only
where changed investment/production decisions or exogenous economic changes increase the targets
value above the value of the interfirm bid. See id. at 1421 n.154, 1426 n.169. Second, their concern
that self-tenders can "dissipate target assets and impose deadweight transaction costs" is, in their
words, "not . .. an objection to self-tenders per se, but to the preceding asset sale, which could have
occurred anyway." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 307. In this respect, it is immaterial that
self-tendering target managers do not put up their own funds. All contestants in the market for corpo-
rate control (including managers who attempt a management buyout) must finance their efforts in
some way. If target managers finance a self-tender through an inappropriate asset sale, they will face
potential claims of fiduciary breach from their shareholders. But that would be true whether or not
the inappropriate asset sale were undertaken to finance a self-tender. Gordon and Kornhauser's real
concern here is mismanaged asset sales, not defensive self-tenders.
37. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 309.
38. Id.
39. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The
Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341, 380-81.
40. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1713 (1985).
41. At least one noted commentator has suggested that "the weight of academic opinion" favors
this view. R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuisrrIONS 928 (1986).
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But let us assume arguendo that Gordon and Kornhauser are correct
about the likelihood of a second-step takeout merger. This permits us to
respond to what we take to be their central criticism of our proposal,
namely that abrogating appraisal rights, as we suggest, is "highly contro-
versial" '42 and "would defeat their express purpose."4 We can state our
disagreement with Gordon and Kornhauser on this point rather simply:
They believe that our proposal is radical and inconsistent with the pur-
poses that underlie the appraisal remedy. We believe, upon reflection, that
our proposal is far less radical than it seems and, in any event, quite
consistent with the conventionally accepted justifications for appraisal.
Let us discuss the latter point first. Why do corporate statutes com-
monly give dissenting shareholders the right to be bought out at "fair
value" when their corporation effects certain major transactions, such as
mergers, substantial asset sales, and material charter amendments? Origi-
nally, of course, states created appraisal rights as a sort of quid pro quo
for abandonment of the historical rule requiring unanimous shareholder
consent to these sorts of transactions. 4 The contemporary arguments for
the appraisal remedy, however, address the ends now thought to be served
by the remedy. For present purposes, two suggested rationales for ap-
praisal are worth noting.4" The first is that shareholders should be able to
cash out their investment rather than be forced into a venture that is very
different from the one in which they originally invested. If, for example,
an investor buys shares in a grocery store chain that is later merged into a
much larger conglomerate only a fraction of whose activities will be in the
food industry, the investor should have a means of cashing out at a fair
In addition, efforts to force takeouts by defining self-dealing more broadly in fair-price charter
provisions may disable controlling shareholders from effecting even innocuous transactions with their
subsidiaries, which seems counterproductive. Cf Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,857 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 1986) (invalidating "poison pill" plan
that, inter alia, barred certain transactions between company and 20%-or-greater shareholder).
42. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 311.
43. Id. at 309.
44. See, e.g., R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 443-44 (1986); Carney, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. Rss. J. 69, 94-97
[hereinafter Fundamental Corporate Changes]; Manning; The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An
Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29 (1962).
45. See generally R. CLARK, supra note 44, at 444-49; (discussing justifications for appraisal
remedy); Fundamental Corporate Changes, supra note 44, at 88-94 (same); Fischel, The Appraisal
Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 875, 877-78 (same); Kanda & Levmore,
The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REv. 429, 433-45 (1985)
(discussing goals of appraisal remedy).
Commentators often mention these two rationales as part of the "conventional view" regarding
appraisal. Many have criticized these justifications as lacking in explanatory power and have offered
alternative explanations. See, e.g., Fischel, supra, at 877-78; Kanda & Levmore, supra, at 434,
437-45. Since we write here primarily in response to the Gordon and Kornhauser critique, we leave
for another day discussion of these criticisms and alternatives. Thus, we confine ourselves to the
Gordon and Kornhauser analysis, and argue that our proposal regarding appraisal makes sense even
accepting their view of the purposes served by that remedy.
331
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price, so that he may reinvest in a venture more likely to satisfy his origi-
nal investment goals and expectations.46
Whether or not investors really have the expectations ascribed to them
by this theory,47 it simply does not apply to second-step takeout mergers,
where the shareholder by definition is cashed out and thus retains no con-
tinuing investment in the merged firm. This leads us to the second con-
ventionally asserted justification for appraisal and, indeed, the only justifi-
cation noted by Gordon and Kornhauser: Since a rule requiring majority
rather than unanimous shareholder consent for the approval of certain
transactions creates the potential for expropriation of minority shareholder
wealth by a firm's majority shareholders, a remedy is needed to mitigate
the risk that minority shareholders will be treated unfairly in such a
transaction. 8
The relevance of the appraisal remedy (and this justification for it) to
acquisitions by tender offer stems from the two-step nature of these trans-
actions. Frequently, bidders make tender offers for a controlling fraction
of the target's outstanding shares. 49 Once the bidder has obtained "con-
trol," it often effects a merger with the target firm. In this context, the
role of the appraisal remedy is to guarantee that the price paid in the
second stage is "fair," which usually means not significantly below the
price paid in the first stage.50
46. R. CLARK, supra note 44, at 444.
47. Some (for example, financial economists) would argue that modern investors are concerned
only with the risk and return offered by their investments. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 117-63 (2d ed. 1984). On the other hand, a merger or other major change
can significantly alter the risk and return of the shareholders' original investments. Moreover, under
existing law investors certainly expect that appraisal rights will attach in the event of extraordinary
corporate transactions. As Professor Clark observes, however, "[wihat this debate shows us is that
people's expectations may adjust to whatever assignments of rights and duties the law in fact imposes.
In such a context, it requires a different set of considerations than people's actual expectations to
decide which expectations the law ought to encourage." R. CLARK, supra note 44, at 444-45.
48. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 309.
49. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE ECONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PAR-
TIAL AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS (1985) [hereinafter SEC STuDY]; see also Bradley & Rosen-
zweig, supra note 1, at 1390 n.54 (explaining differences between two-tier, partial, and any-or-all
bids). Indeed, even with any-or-all bids, where the bidder seeks up to 100% of the target's shares, a
control-winning bid will rarely (one is tempted to say never) attract all of the target shares; there are
always holdouts for one reason or another. See id. at 1391 n.56. Thus, even where the bid is not
expressly "two-tier" or "partial," a successful bid almost always leaves a fraction of the target's shares
unpurchased. Moreover, these unpurchased shares generally trade at a discount relative to the offer
price. See SEC STuDY, supra, at 24 & Tables 4a, 5, & 9. In this respect, Gordon and Kornhauser
may be overly optimistic in asserting that "the any-or-all interfirm bid does not present the distorted
shareholder choice problems that concern Bradley and Rosenzweig .... " Gordon & Kornhauser,
supra note 2, at 308 n.33.
50. Professor Fischel, for example, sees the appraisal remedy as a solution to the prisoner's di-
lemma that could confront target shareholders, since it precludes bidders from paying a substantial
premium for a controlling interest and then freezing out the remaining minority interest at a signifi-
cantly lower price. Fischel, supra note 45, at 879; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at
1414 (noting constraining influence of appraisal statutes against potential corporate raiders).
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'Gordon and Kornhauser believe that target shareholders need the pro-
tection that appraisal affords, even in the context of a defensive self-
tender. Evidently, they fear that if control-winning bidders were not con-
strained by appraisal statutes, they could harm target shareholders by
freezing them out at an unfair price. Gordon and Kornhauser therefore
criticize us for proposing to nullify the appraisal remedy in circumstances
that seem to invoke its very purpose.
Our disagreement with Gordon and Kornhauser on this point is as ba-
sic as it is clear. They find nullification of the appraisal remedy in the
context of defensive self-tenders inconsistent with the purpose of protect-
ing target shareholders against the unfairness of this kind of wealth ex-
propriation. We believe such protection is unnecessary in this setting and
that, ironically, preserving the appraisal remedy threatens great potential
harm to the very shareholders whose protection is at stake.
Eliminating defensive self-tenders from target management's arsenal,
we argue, could harm target shareholders by making their firm more vul-
nerable to value-decreasing bids. But we also recognize that target share-
holders would be ill-served by rules permitting target managers to defeat
value-increasing bids; hence we propose the conditions for defensive self-
tenders noted above.51 Gordon and Kornhauser, as we just noted, reject
one of those conditions-nullification of the appraisal remedy-as radical
and conceptually unjustified, and they implicitly criticize the other two as
difficult and cumbersome. 2 But their real disagreement is with our basic
assertion that defensive self-tenders are a valuable means of protecting
target shareholders against value-decreasing bids. Since they do not share
our belief that the availability of defensive self-tenders helps deter corpo-
rate raiding, they conclude that our proposal carries some very real costs
but offers only illusory benefits.52 We claim not only that the asserted
benefits of defensive self-tenders are real, but that the costs are either jus-
tified or not nearly as substantial as Gordon and Kornhauser would
suggest.
These two points, of course, are closely related. First, what are the costs
that trouble Gordon and Kornhauser? Apart from the cumbersome nature
of our conditions (to which we will return), their concern seems to be that
eliminating appraisal would harm target shareholders. But that is simply
untrue, if one accepts our claim regarding the value of defensive self-
tenders. In other words, if defensive self-tenders (subject to our conditions)
help prevent raids, then the protections ordinarily afforded by appraisal
are unnecessary in the context of such self-tenders. In the final analysis,
51. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
52. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 309, 311.
53. Id. at 311.
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therefore, we must return to that basic question: Are defensive self-tenders
really a valuable weapon for deterring value-decreasing bids?
Gordon and Kornhauser's skepticism regarding the value of defensive
self-tender offers derives from their confidence that other mechanisms ade-
quately deter potential corporate raiders. In other words, they do not dis-
pute our claim that defensive self-tenders, subject to the conditions we
propose, can defeat value-decreasing but not value-increasing bids.
Rather, they claim that the conditions we suggest would exact too high a
price for a safeguard that is, in their view, redundant at best. 4
Since we disagree that the function we attribute to defensive self-tenders
is reliably performed by other mechanisms, we naturally come to different
conclusions regarding the value of defensive self-tenders and the accept-
ability of our conditions. Again, this is not unexplored territory; in our
article we considered the claim now repeated by Gordon and Korn-
hauser-that legal rules (i.e., appraisal statutes and the common law of
fiduciary responsibility) and competition in the market for corporate con-
trol effectively prevent raiding-and we concluded that these alternatives
do not offer sufficient protection. 55 In order to respond to Gordon and
Kornhauser, we will expand on our earlier discussion.
Gordon and Kornhauser say that movements in the price of target
shares will attract other potential bidders in the event of a value-
decreasing bid.58 But they simply ignore our argument that the incentive
of firms to compete in the market for corporate control may well be re-
duced because of the peculiar attributes of that market. In a corporate
control contest, all potential acquisition gains -could be dissipated rather
than captured by any competitor, even the winner, since competition gen-
erally consists of a series of revised (and costly) bids that are made before
any target shares are actually purchased. Contrary to Gordon and Korn-
hauser's assertion, this does not necessarily mean that there is "large scale
failure"58 in this market; it does suggest, however, that competition in this
market is sufficiently imperfect to justify the availability of other deter-
rents to corporate raids.59
54. Id. at 309-11.
55. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1412 n.129, 1414-17.
56. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 310.
57. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1415-16.
58. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 310.
59. See also Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J.
48, 52 (1986) (arguing that potential second bidders may be discouraged from competing by recogni-
tion that first bidder will disregard its sunk costs in deciding whether to raise its bid). Gordon and
Kornhauser also criticize us for "hypothesiz[ing] a situation in which target management [knows] of
the bidder's nefarious back end intentions (and so would be justified in initiating a self-tender), but
the market [does] not . . . ." They argue that such a "scenario seems, in general, highly implausi-
ble." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 310.
We hypothesize no such situation. Rather, we rely on management's interest in preserving its con-
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Gordon and Kornhauser also question (at least implicitly) our unwill-
ingness to rely on fiduciary obligations and appraisal statutes to prevent
value-decreasing bids. 60 But there can be little doubt, in view of decisions
such as Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 1 that the law of fiduciary responsi-
bility permits a parent corporation to engage in considerable irremediable
self-dealing with its subsidiary, to the detriment of the subsidiary's minor-
ity shareholders. 2 Moreover, commentators other than Gordon and Korn-
hauser have long acknowledged the imperfections of the appraisal rem-
edy. 3 Against this substantial commentary, Gordon and Kornhauser offer
very little to justify their apparent confidence in appraisal.
We again urge caution, therefore, to those who would conclude that the
benefits provided by defensive self-tenders are illusory and at best redun-
dant. If, as we believe, the alternative mechanisms on which some would
rely to deter raiding bids are inadequate, then the benefits of defensive
self-tenders are quite real, and the ban proposed by Gordon and Korn-
hauser would in fact harm target shareholders. In addition, nullifying the
appraisal remedy in the context of a defensive self-tender should cause
little concern, since the function ordinarily performed by ap-
praisal-protecting target shareholders against wealth expropria-
tion-would be performed by the self-tender."
Note again, moreover, that defensive self-tenders pose real dangers un-
less the appraisal remedy is inoperative. Thus, as we have demonstrated
elsewhere, 5 the existence of appraisal rights would constrain bidders but
not target managers, thus enabling the latter to "front end load" their
self-tender and thereby defeat even value-increasing interfirm bids.66 Iron-
trol over the target as the principal motivation for a defensive self-tender. Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 1, at 1416. Moreover, Gordon and Kornhauser's claim that target management can simply
inform the market of the bidder's nefarious character (where that information does happen to be
known) is questionable. Mere announcements (as compared with a competing bid) are unlikely to
move the target's share price sufficiently to solve the prisoner's dilemma that would confront share-
holders as a result of a raiding bid.
60. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 300 & n.15, 309 & n.37.
61. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
62. Id. at 720; see also R. GIsoN, supra note 41, at 928-29; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRANSACTIONS IN CONTROL 26 n.10 (Reporters' Study No.
1, Feb. 22, 1985) [hereinafter A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY]; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at
1412 n.129 (parent company often has opportunity to favor itself at expense of subsidiary's minority
shareholders).
63. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1415 n.135 (authorities cited); A.L.I. REPORT-
ERS' STUDY, supra note 62, at 3-19; R. CLARK, supra note 44, at 449-58; M. EiSENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 83 (1976); R. GILSON, supra note 41, at 885-87.
64. In this respect, eliminating appraisal in this setting would be far less radical than Gordon and
Kornhauser suggest. There have long been provisions-for example, the stock-market exception, see,
e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (1983)-denying appraisal in circumstances in which the
-remedy's protections are thought unnecessary.
65. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1419 n.150; see also supra notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text.
66. Cf Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (enjoining target managers'
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ically, therefore, far from protecting target shareholders, preservation of
the appraisal remedy in the context of a defensive self-tender could seri-
ously harm them by facilitating the defeat of premium takeover bids. Tar-
get shareholders and, for that matter, society at large are better served by
rules that help maintain an even playing field in corporate control
contests.
7
Finally, what about the Gordon and Kornhauser claims that the condi-
tions6s we would impose on defensive self-tenders are cumbersome and
represent "changes . from present arrangements" ?69 We concede both
points (although we note that the SEC has now adopted one of our condi-
tions-the bar against discriminatory defensive self-tenders-in its recent
amendments to Rule 13e-4),7 0 but we question the significance of these
criticisms. Takeover defensive measures can pose real risks to target
shareholders and society generally by impeding value-increasing take-
overs7 1 We think it appropriate that defensive responses be subjected to
restrictions (even cumbersome restrictions) designed to disable managers
from thwarting such acquisitions. Given the self-interest that often moti-
vates resistant target managers,72 this does not seem objectionable.
IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORMS OF THE-APPRAISAL REMEDY IN
CONTROL CONTESTS
As we have noted, our proposal to disable target shareholders from
seeking appraisal in the context of a defensive self-tender derives from our
preference for an "even playing field" in corporate control contests: The
existence of appraisal rights seriously disadvantages interfirm bidders in
their competition against self-tendering target managers. In order to em-
phasize this point-that our concern is evenhandedness rather than repeal
of the appraisal remedy per se-we conclude this reply by briefly describ-
attempt to exempt leveraged buyout proposal from appraisal provisions, on ground that exemption
would unfairly disadvantage competing interfirm bidder).
67. For recent decisions discussing the importance of an "even playing field" in corporate control
contests, see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986)
(enjoining "lock-up option" on ground that it inappropriately favored one bidder); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (same with respect to "no-shop"
provision).
68. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
69. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 311.
70. See Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [Current Binderi Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016
(july 11, 1986).
71. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corpora-
tions: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 825 (1981);
Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MIca. L. REv. (forthcoming 1986).
72. See authorities cited supra note 71 (discussing target management's conflict of interest); see
also Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1986) (same).
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ing three alternative reforms of the appraisal remedy that would accom-
plish the desired result of preserving a fair competition between bidders
and target managers with less radical change from the status quo. We do
not mean to suggest that any of these alternatives is superior to our origi-
nal proposal; they should, however, allay the concerns of those who fear
that nullifying the appraisal remedy is too drastic a "change[] . . . from
present arrangements." 3
A. Ex Ante Appraisal
One alternative to nullifying the appraisal remedy would be to require
bidders to offer to buy any and all target shares at the pre-offer price.
Under this alternative, which we label "ex ante appraisal," bidding firms
would be forced to stand ready to pay the pre-offer market price for all
shares tendered. Put differently, this proposal would allow target share-
holders either to sell their holdings to the bidder at the pre-offer price or
to participate in the outstanding tender offer. A target shareholder electing
to participate in the tender offer would be precluded from seeking ap-
praisal for the shares not purchased by the bidder in the first stage of the
offer.
Obviously, target shareholders believing that the sum of the first and
second stages of a two-tier offer is likely to be less than the pre-offer value
of their holdings would elect under this proposal to sell all of their shares
to the bidder at the pre-offer price. Those believing that the value of the
offer probably exceeds the pre-offer price would eschew the option to sell
their holdings at this price and elect instead to participate in the tender
offer. Under this scheme, shareholders would be protected - from value-
decreasing bids; at the same time, bidders would be able to make front-
end-loaded tender offers unconstrained by the appraisal remedy.
B. Blended Appraisal
A second alternative to appraisal, suggested by Professor Fischel, 4
would be to calculate the appropriate remedy relative to the blended price
paid by the bidding firm, which is P in Equation (1).75 This alternative
proposal exploits the fact that under current regulations, oversubscribed
offers must be effected on a pro rata basis.78
One can think of this proposal as applying the appraisal remedy to
73. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 311.
74. Fischel, supra note 45, at 897.
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1986). Thus, assuming 100% subscription, P in Equation (1) would
be equal to the price that each target shareholder would receive from tendering.
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total shareholder wealth, rather than the price of the firm's stock. This
approach is sensible, since it is. the wealth of the firm's shareholders
rather than the price paid on the "back end" that is most relevant to
concerns regarding fairness to target shareholders. As long as the weighted
average of the prices paid by the bidder on the front and back ends of the
offer exceeds the pre-offer price of the target shares, the offer will enhance
the wealth of target shareholders regardless of the price paid on the back
end. Indeed, under this proposal, the wealth of target shareholders could
increase even if the back end price were literally zero.
This "blended appraisal" procedure would accomplish our goal of "eve-
ning the playing field" in corporate control contests by allowing bidders to
front end load their bids to the same extent as target managers. Moreover,
the proposal would effectively deter corporate raiders, who would be dis-
abled from front end loading their bids so as to pay target shareholders a
total amount equal to less than the firm's pre-offer value.
C. Self-Appraisal
A final alternative would be to allow target shareholders to seek an
appraisal remedy in the wake of a successful defensive self-tender offer.
Under this scheme, target managers would be required to stand ready to
redeem, at the pre-offer price, the target shares not purchased in the de-
fensive self-tender offer. To this end, target managers would be forced to
seek outside financing to ensure that the premium repurchase (defensive
self-tender) would not dilute the value of the remaining target shares.
Thus, the managers of both the target and bidding firms would be forced
to compete against each other in the same capital market for funds to
finance their competing tender offers.
V. CONCLUSION
Gordon and Kornhauser note the "initial power"" of our analysis but
claim that "laborious unraveling"1 8 reveals its serious shortcomings. We
have attempted to respond to their criticisms by extending our original
arguments regarding the costs and benefits of defensive stock repurchases.
In the process, we have argued that the conditions we would impose on
defensive self-tender offers are sensibly designed to ensure that such trans-
actions will be more beneficial than costly. Whether the result is an "ap-
propriate use of law and economics models as a basis for policy prescrip-
tions" 9 is a judgment we leave to others.
77. Gordon and Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 311.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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